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I. INTRODUCTION
Each Chief Justice of the United States makes his mark on
his Court, leading different jurisprudential projects and agendas, and
moving and developing the law in some area. The New Deal Court
of Charles Evan Hughes extended government power and ultimately
upheld the New Deal;' the Warren Court is associated with the
expansion of individual liberties, especially in the areas of racial
equality, freedom of speech, and criminal procedure; 2 the Rehnquist
Court is associated with federalism.3  Even if a Court never
4
completes its doctrinal project, it targets some area of the law in a
* Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. This paper was presented in
Evolution or Revolution? American Civil Procedure in the 21st Century, at the
2011 Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools.
1. E.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 406-08 (1937).
2. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 494 (1966); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See also Burt
Neuborne, The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 59, 60 (arguing that much of the Warren Court's jurisprudence can be
understood as attacking and remedying systemic racial inequality).
3. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567-68 (1995). See also Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1114-15 (2006) (arguing that hostility to
litigation and the institution of judicially focused dispute resolution was a central
theme of Rehnquist Court jurisprudence).
4. Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 2 (2005) (upholding federal
prohibition on purely intrastate possession and production of marijuana);
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (holding that Congress validly
abrogated sovereign immunity in enacting Americans With Disabilities Act);
Neuborne, supra note 2, at 60.
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particular direction. What a particular Court cares about may change
over time and may not always be clear, especially in the early years
of a new Court with a new Chief Justice and a mass of new
members.
John G. Roberts was sworn in as Chief Justice of the United
States in September 2005, and three Associate Justices have joined
the Court since then.5 Entering its seventh Term in October 2011,
the Roberts Court is newly engaged in an unexpected area--civil
procedure. The Court includes four Justices whose backgrounds
suggest particular solicitude for and perhaps keen interest in civil
procedure: Chief Justice Roberts was a civil litigator; Justice
Ginsburg, also a civil litigator, has written extensively on civil
procedure; Justice Kagan taught civil procedure; and Justice
Sotomayor was a district court judge for six years, meaning she
alone among the Justices has worked with the Federal Rules and
6
understands how they function on the ground. Over the past six
Terms, the Court has heard and decided more than twenty cases in
core civil procedure areas, including pleading,7 summary judgment,8
relation back of amended pleadings,9 personal jurisdiction,10 federal
question jurisdiction," diversity jurisdiction,' 2 jurisdictionality,13
5. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT
OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutibiographies.aspx (last visited
Oct. 12, 2011).
6. Id.
7. E.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009); Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
8. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007). See also Howard M.
Wasserman, Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v.
Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 180 (2008).
9. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2497 (2010).
10. E.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2856 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2783-84
(2011).
11. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 10-1195, 2012 WL 125429 (U.S.
Jan. 18, 2012); Gonzalez v. Thaler, No. 10-895, 2012 WL 43513 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2012); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 683
(2006).
12. E.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010); Marshall v.
Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299-300 (2006); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81,
84 (2005).
314 [Vol. 31:2
CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL
removal procedure,14 class actions, civil representation,16
arbitration of civil and civil rights claims in lieu of litigation,17
appealability, remedies,19 and the Erie-Hanna doctrine.20 Several
of these decisions have been significant and potentially far-reaching.
The Court's re-engagement with civil procedure is welcome.
While the lower courts do an admirable job in creating, developing,
and applying procedural law, the Supreme Court is a necessary
source of procedural leadership and, we would hope, clarity-a point
Roberts made in his confirmation hearings.2' Of course, having civil
procedure on the doctrinal agenda will not draw the attention or ire
of the popular media or the public; do not expect public calls to
13. E.g., Gonzalez v. Thaler, No. 10-895, 2012 WL 43513 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2012); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011);
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010); Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 502-04 (2006). See also Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L.
REv. 1 (2008) (discussing conflation of jurisdiction with other legal concepts);
Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of "Drive-By" Jurisdictional Rulings, 105
Nw. U. L. REv. 947, 947-48 (2011) [hereinafter Wasserman, Drive-By] (same);
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L.
REV. 579, 579-82 (2007) (same).
14. E.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1867 (2009);
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 229 (2007); Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 639 (2006).
15. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); Smith
v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
16. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
17. E.g., Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779-80
(2010); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
18. E.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2026 (2011); Ortiz v. Jordan,
131 S. Ct. 884, 893 (2011); Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609
(2009); Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 354 (2006).
19. E.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1675 (2010);
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 514 (2008); Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007).
20. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1444 (2010). See generally Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of
Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 987 (2011).
21. Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, What Conservative Constitutional
Revolution? Moderating Five Years of Judicial Conservatism After Six Years of
the Roberts Court, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 40-
41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1892953.
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impeach Roberts over the scope of Rule 8(a). Indeed, it may not
draw the attention of many beyond the civil procedure professoriate,
and even then only with a modicum of sarcasm. In June 2011,
Justice Kagan announced the unanimous decision in Smith v. Bayer
Corp., which dealt with the Anti-Injunction Act and the preclusive
effect of a class certification decision, introducing the case as a
"complicated procedural ruling." 22  One blogger reporting at the
Court restated this introduction as, "if you understand anything I say,
you have a law degree AND you had your cup of coffee."23
If civil procedure and the Federal Rules comprise a
significant part of the Roberts Court's emerging jurisprudential
agenda, it is worth exploring the Court's activity in this area, both to
see and understand the trend that has been developing and to predict
where it might go in coming years. This essay first examines some
organizing themes in the recent decisions on the subject. It then
considers the Court's actions with respect to the other actors and
procedures in civil rulemaking-Congress, lower federal courts, and
the committees working under the Rules Enabling Act24 (REA)-and
the ambivalence, if not hostility, among the competing rulemaking
institutions.
II. ORGANIZING THEMES IN THE CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL
Five themes have developed in the Court's early cases that
provide some perspective on the new developments in civil
procedure. These themes do not necessarily link all the cases into a
coherent whole, but they do provide some ideas around which to
organize our understanding of the Court's activity.
First, it is fair to call the Court's interest in procedure a
"revival," because it comes after a substantial lull in procedure cases
on the Court's docket during the later years of the Rehnquist Court.
The recent uptick is all the more striking. When in the October 2010
22. 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376 (2011).
23. Howard M. Wasserman, Federal Procedure Day at the Supreme Court,
PRAWFSBLAWG (June 16, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2011/06/federal-procedure-day-at-the-supreme-court.html (emphasis in original).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
[Vol. 31:2316
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Term, the Court decided companion personal jurisdiction cases, 25it
marked the Court's first decisions on personal jurisdiction in more
26than twenty years. For perspective, Justice David Souter joined the
Court in the fall of 1990 (five months after Burnham) and served for
nineteen years,27 but he never decided a personal jurisdiction case,
despite occasional explicit requests from lower-court judges for the
Supreme Court to provide some definitive answers to lingering
28questions.
There were similar gaps in other areas. The Roberts Court
decided its first case on Rule 15(c), controlling relation back of
amended pleadings, in almost twenty years 29 (and the first under the
Rule as amended in 199130), and its first direct case on the Erie-
Hanna doctrine in almost fifteen years.3 1  The Court also has
resolved questions about procedural statutes that have lingered for
decades. In 1958, Congress amended the diversity jurisdiction
statute to define a corporation's citizenship, in part, by its principal
place of business;32 in 2009, the Court for the first time addressed
and resolved the meaning of that term.33
Second, the Court has tried to clean up doctrinal confusion
created by its predecessor Courts. One area of clean-up, which I
have written about previously, is jurisdictionality and the elimination
of "drive-by jurisdictional rulings," decisions in which a legal rule
has been labeled as jurisdictional only through "unrefined" analysis
25. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
26. E.g., Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
27. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT
OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/aboutbiographies.aspx (last visited
Oct. 12, 2011).
28. See, e.g., Luv n' care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 474-76 (5th
Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (calling on the Supreme Court to
resolve the debate about stream-of-commerce in personal jurisdiction analysis),
cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2006).
29. Compare Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2497
(2010), with Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986).
30. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c) (amended 1991).
31. Compare Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130
S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010), with Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 427-28 (1996).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2006).
33. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1189-90 (2010).
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without rigorous consideration of the label's meaning or
34
consequences. The Court has explicitly retreated from its own
admittedly "profligate" and "less than meticulous" use of the word
"jurisdiction," making a deliberate, concerted move towards greater
"discipline" in defining which rules are jurisdictional and which are
not.35 Some Justices have even argued that these earlier drive-by
rulings are no longer entitled to full precedential effect. 36
The Supreme Court also wants lower courts to follow its lead
on this issue. It has taken on some cases explicitly to resolve
jurisdictionality issues.3 7  In other cases, it has reached out to
announce the proper characterization of a rule, even where its
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional nature was not at the heart of the
case or even contested by the parties; the Court simply believed the
lower court had mischaracterized the rule, wanted to signal the
proper understanding going forward, and could do so without
affecting the outcome. The Court is willing to correct what it
views as doctrinal missteps in the lower courts, even when tangential
to the broader issue in the case before it.
Third, the Court has made significant theoretical and
doctrinal pronouncements, often producing dramatic theoretical and
doctrinal shifts. The most-discussed example is pleading standards,
which have generated something of a scholarly cottage industry.39
34. Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 947-48.
35. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011);
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244 (2010); Wasserman,
Drive-By, supra note 13, at 947.
36. Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1251 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006);
Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 952, 967.
37. E.g., Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1200; Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1241;
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516.
38. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010);
Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 949.
39. Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 873 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the
Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 116 (2009);
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems,
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 832 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly:
How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 61, 62 (2007); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal:
A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2010);
318 [Vol. 31:2
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The Rehnquist Court's two statements on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) and pleading-in 2002 and 1993-reaffirmed the
Court's historic decision in Conley v. Gibson, rejected heightened or
fact pleading outside of fraud, and accepted that a complaint is
sufficient unless it "appears beyond doubt that the pleader can assert
no set of facts that would entitle him to relief."4 0 True, the lower
courts had frequently required plaintiffs to plead increasingly
specific facts-so much so that Professor Chris Fairman labeled
notice leading a "myth."4 1 But the Rehnquist Court twice rebuffed
them.
But Twombly in 200743 and Iqbal in 200944 changed, or
appeared to change, the pleading landscape. Read together, the cases
gave the "no set of facts" standard its "retirement," 45 requiring
instead that a pleading contain sufficient facts, accepted as true when
pled in a non-conclusory manner, to enable a judge applying her own
common sense and experience to conclude that it is plausible that a
violation of the plaintiffs rights had occurred.46 Part of what made
Twombly (and subsequently Iqbal) so surprising is that the change
came from nowhere, introducing entirely new concepts-
Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1011-12; A.
Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1
(2009); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1293
(2010); Symposium, Pondering Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 1 (2010);
Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the Federal
Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss (manuscript at 3), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1904134.
40. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002); Leatherman
v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69
(1993).
41. Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551,
551-52 (2002); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth ofNotice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REv. 987, 988 (2003).
42. Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 319-
20 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008).
43. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
44. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
45. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63.
46. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57.
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nonconclusoriness and plausibility-that had not appeared in any
pleading cases from any court.47
Debate remains on whether Iqbal and Twombly actually
changed anything district courts are doing on the ground beyond
rhetoric.48 Nevertheless, the cases do represent a reversal of the
dynamics between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. Rather
than the Supreme Court rebuffing lower courts when they pushed
pleading standards upward as in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the
Court adopted the higher standards that some lower-court judges had
been imposing, reversed two more permissive decisions by the lower
courts in the process, and signaled to lower-court judges that the
stricter approach some had been taking was appropriate under the
Federal Rules. 49
We may see a similar theoretical and rhetorical shift in
personal jurisdiction after McIntyre v. Nicastro, where the Court
considered whether a non-U.S. defendant could be subject to
jurisdiction in New Jersey, when it never entered or sent its product
there but instead sold throughout the United States through an Ohio
distributor.5 0 Writing for a plurality, Justice Kennedy held there was
no jurisdiction because the defendant had national contacts with the
United States, but not with the forum state.5 1 Kennedy repeatedly
spoke about personal jurisdiction in structural terms of judicial
power, sovereignty and sovereign authority, submission by the
defendant (through its conduct) to the power of the sovereign, and
the invalidity of a "judgment rendered in the absence of authority." 52
But, as Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent, this marked at least a
rhetorical (if not substantive) departure from prevailing personal
jurisdiction doctrine, which is grounded in due process concerns for
foreseeability, reasonableness, and fundamental fairness, not the
"reach" of a sovereign's power or the defendant's consent to that
47. Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1352-53, 1355-56 (2010); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note
39, at 832.
48. Mark Moller, Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 667 (2011).
49. Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 151-52 (2010); Moller, supra note 48, at 666-67.
50. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
51. Id. at 2790-91.
52. Id. at 2786-89.
[ Vol. 3 1: 2320
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sovereignty. 53  This new submission-to-authority language makes
personal jurisdiction sound more like subject-matter jurisdiction,
with the latter's focus on structural adjudicative authority over a
case.
There were hints of a different doctrinal shift in the
companion personal jurisdiction case, which involved general
jurisdiction in North Carolina over the Turkish subsidiary of an
American company in a case arising from a tire that exploded in
France.54 A unanimous Court appeared to narrow, if not outright
reject, "doing business" general jurisdiction. 5 That doctrine
provides that a business entity could have continuous and systematic
minimum business contacts with a forum that, if substantial enough,56
could subject it to jurisdiction in that forum for all purposes.
Several lower courts, including the lower court in Goodyear, had
carried that doctrine quite far.57 But the Supreme Court rejected this
"sprawling" view of general jurisdiction. It drew a sharp line
between general and specific personal jurisdiction and seemed to
limit the former to the "paradigm" of the defendant's home or places
where it is "essentially at home."5 These include an individual's
domicile and a business's place of incorporation and principal place
of business.60 But the Court never indicated whether home could go
beyond those places. Even if doing substantial "continuous and
53. Id. at 2798-99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2850-51 (2011).
55. Id. at 2856-57.
56. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16
(1984).
57. See e.g., Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding general jurisdiction in state over foreign manufacturer on stream-of-
commerce theory), rev. denied, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010), rev'd sub nom.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011);
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that out-of-state defendant could be subject to general jurisdiction based on
extensive marketing and sales in forum, extensive contacts with vendors in forum,
and operation of "sophisticated virtual store"), vacated on granting of reh'g en
banc, 366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2003), dismissed as moot, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.
2005).
58. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856-57.
59. Id. at 2853-54.
60. Id.
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systematic" business in a state-operating stores, maintaining
offices, and making sales-can create general jurisdiction, the Court
left unexplained how much business is sufficient to render a
defendant essentially at home in a state. 61
Fourth, and relatedly, the Court has frequently painted with
minimalist strokes in its procedure cases. As Cass Sunstein defines
the concept, a minimalist court tries to say no more than necessary to
resolve a case and justify an outcome, leaving as much as possible
undecided.62 Courts do not decide issues that are not before them;
they take cases as presented (presumably as framed by the litigants
in the adversary process), decide only the piece of the puzzle
presented, and leave other pieces for later resolution by other
actors.63 This minimalist stance is not surprising. Roberts regularly
espouses the virtues of minimalism, insisting, for example, "if it is
not necessary to decide more [to dispose of a case], it is necessary
not to decide more . . . ."64 He and Justice Alito (who joined the
Court the same Term as Roberts 65) both advocated such minimalism
in their confirmation hearings66 and both have carved out uniquely
narrow positions in some other areas. 67
61. Allan Erbsen, Personal Jurisdiction, Goodyear v. Brown, and Homely
Line Drawing, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 28, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2011/07/personal-jurisdiction-goodyear-v-brown-and-homely-line-
drawing.html#more.
62. Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L.
REv. 2234, 2242 (2006).
63. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3, 10-11 (1999); Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth
Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 29
(2010); Moller, supra note 48, at 662; Rhodes, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4-5);
Sunstein, supra note 62, at 2242.
64. PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rhodes, supra
note 21 (manuscript at 17-18). See also Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More
Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A16 (quoting Chief Justice
Roberts's comments at Georgetown University Law Center graduation).
65. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME CT. OF
THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct.
12, 2011).
66. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 343 (2006) (statement of J. Samuel A. Alito,
Jr., Nominee to Be Associate Justice of the United States); Confirmation Hearing
322 [Vol. 31:2
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But Supreme Court minimalism can be criticized for
functionally shifting decision costs to other actors-namely lower
courts and future litigants-without providing explicit guidance and
forcing them to read between the lines to give content to the law,
often at greater future expense.68 While the Court has reached out to
create issues in some jurisdictionality cases, that weakness has been
on display in many other procedural areas. For example, Twombly
initially left as many questions as it resolved. Did it apply to all
cases or only to antitrust cases? 69 Did the Court impose heightened
or fact pleading, something it explicitly disclaimed?"o Was Conley
truly overruled or was Twombly simply an application of Conley,
beyond rejecting the overstated (and arguably misunderstood7 1) "no
set of facts" language? Did plausibility apply to pleadings other than
complaints, such as answers and counterclaims, or to non-merits
issues, such as jurisdictional allegations? 72
Iqbal resolved some of those questions two years later:
plausibility was the new standard for Rule 8(a)(2), and it definitely
applied beyond antitrust.7 3  But other questions remained. Iqbal
more explicitly emphasized the policy justifications underlying the
on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be ChiefJustice of the United States:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United States); Rhodes,
supra note 21 (manuscript at 17-18, 22).
67. E.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011)
(Alito, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 615 (2007) (plurality opinion of Alito,
J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, J.); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
422-23 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring).
68. SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 48; Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of
Itself Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1951,
2006 (2005); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 326 (1998).
69. A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 457-59
(2008).
70. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007).
71. Sherwin, supra note 42, at 315-16.
72. Clermont, supra note 47, at 1359-61; Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility
Beyond the Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript
8-22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1721062.
73. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
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new pleading standard: protecting certain high-ranking government
defendants in certain cases from the purportedly overwhelming costs
and burdens of discovery and litigation.74 That leaves lower courts
to question whether the plausibility requirement perhaps should not
apply in cases that do not implicate those policy concerns-non-
discovery-intensive cases or cases not involving qualified immunity
and sensitive, high-ranking government officials. Ultimately,
Iqbal's "extremely fuzzy content" makes it readily "susceptible to
both permissive and restrictive interpretations" in later cases, facts,
and contexts.76
Minimalism's gaps and shifted costs may be exacerbated by
the Court's failure to achieve a majority. Consider McIntyre again.
In its 1987 Asahi decision, the Court left open whether a defendant
established minimum contacts simply by placing a product into the
stream of commerce knowing or expecting that it could end up in the
forum (as four Justices, led by Justice Brennan, argued) or whether
the defendant must do something more to intentionally serve or reach
the forum (as four Justices, led by Justice O'Connor, argued).7 7 That
dispute between "stream of commerce" and "stream of commerce
plus" rattled around the lower courts for more than twenty years.78
In McIntyre, the New Jersey Supreme Court had discussed this long-
standing debate and adopted "stream of commerce" as the approach
74. Id. at 1953-54.
75. See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.)
(suggesting that Twombly and Iqbal might not control where defendant is unlikely
to face heavy burden of compliance with discovery demands or where case does
not involve high-level government officials). See also Howard M. Wasserman,
Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 157, 175 (2010) [hereinafter Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches]
(discussing similar narrow approach to Iqbal, although emphasizing that nothing in
the decision limits it in that way).
76. Moller, supra note 48, at 664.
77. Compare Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 111-
12 (1987) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell and Scalia, JJ.), with id
at 116-18 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
78. E.g., Luv n' care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 474-76 (5th Cir.
2006) (DeMoss, J., specially concurring), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2006);
Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 587-89 (N.J. 2010), rev'd,
131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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more consistent with the due process theory underlying personal
jurisdiction. 79
The expectation when the Court took McIntyre was that it
would finally resolve the split. But it did not (or was unable to) do
so. Four Justices again adopted stream-plus; Justice Kennedy's
plurality explicitly and sharply rejected the view that merely placing
a product in the stream of commerce could be a sufficient contact,
rejected the emphasis on a defendant's expectations as opposed to
intention, and labeled Justice Brennan's stream of commerce view
"inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power."80  But
Justices Breyer and Alito, although agreeing that jurisdiction was
lacking, declined to resolve the debate, believing it unnecessary to
decide the broad abstract legal question in a case in which, in their
view, the absence of contacts with the forum state was clear.8'
In other words, after waiting twenty years to hear a personal
jurisdiction case and taking a case that squarely presented the
stream-stream-plus divide, the Court still left the issue unresolved.
Lower courts might take cues from the plurality's emphatic
language, as well as its recasting of the doctrine in sovereignty
terms, as a reason to move towards stream-plus. But this still
imposes on lower courts the costs and burdens of reading tea leaves.
Of course, in civil procedure, as in other areas, the Court is
minimalist, except when it is not.82 Wal-Mart v. Dukes involved a
massive sex-discrimination class action against a major nationwide
corporation, making it the rare civil procedure case to draw
significant scholarly and mainstream media coverage, which largely
focused on its potential effect on substantive employment
discrimination law.83 The district court had certified a nationwide
79. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 589.
80. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2784.
81. Id. at 2792-93 (Breyer, J., joined by Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
82. Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court kills campaign
finance reform, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2242209/. See
also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 919 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
("[S]ometimes it is necessary to decide more.") (emphasis in original).
83. E.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Take up Crucial Issue in Wal-Mart Suit, N.
Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2011, at B 1; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Sociology
Issue in Wal-Mart Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A17; Jason
Bent, Comment to Oral Argument Transcript in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, WORKPLACE
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class of nearly 1.5 million present and former Wal-Mart employees,
who alleged that discretionary pay and promotion decisions by
supervisors at different stores in different places at different times
(pursuant to corporate policy delegating such decisions to local
discretion) violated Title VII. 4 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief, damages, and back pay.
The Court was unanimous that the class action could not be
brought. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) by its terms
permits only class actions for injunctive or declaratory relief, not
individual monetary relief that is more than incidental to the
equitable relief.86 Minimalism would dictate that the Court stop
there. It had decided what it had to in order to reject the class action
and resolve the question before it. The case should have been
remanded for determination of whether the class could be maintained
under a different part of Rule 23, namely Rule 23(b)(3), which
permits class certification so long as the class action device is the
best way to adjudicate the controversy and the common questions of
law or fact predominate over any differences among class
members.87
But a five-Justice majority did not stop at this narrowest basis
for decision. Instead, it reached out to decide additional issues. The
Court had granted certiorari on whether the class satisfied the
threshold in Rule 23(af(2) that there be "questions of law or fact
common to the class,"& although Wal-Mart had not raised that issue
in its petition.89 The majority held that the class failed to meet this
threshold; given the size and geographic spread of the class,
differences among the class members, and differences among the
PROF BLOG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/
2011/03/oral-argument-transcript-in-wal-mart-v-dukes.html; Michael Waterstone,
Wal-Mart and the Future of Employment Discrimination Class Action Law,
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS (June 22, 2011), http://llsblog.lIs.edu/faculty/2011/06/wal-
mart-and-the-future-of-employment-discrimination-class-action-law.html.
84. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547-48 (2011).
85. Id. at 2547.
86. Id. at 2557-59; id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547 n.1, 2561
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
89. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010) (mem.).
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actors and decisions being challenged, there was no commonality
among the plaintiffs.90 This triggered a back-and-forth between
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg over whether predominance-the
balance of commonalities and differences among class claims and
claimants-is properly part of the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality
analysis, or whether that provision imposes a lower threshold,
satisfied so long as there are some similar questions among class
members.9' From a minimalist perspective, however, the additional
discussion was inappropriate because it was unnecessary; the Court
had already found a reason to reject the class and any further analysis
should have been left to the lower courts on remand.92
The Court similarly split on what to decide in Camreta v.
Greene.93 Before the Court was an appeal by a deputy sheriff and a
child protective services caseworker from Oregon who together had
interviewed a 14-year-old girl without a warrant or parental
permission about alleged sexual abuse at the hands of her father.94
The officials had prevailed on qualified immunity grounds; the Ninth
Circuit held that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' Fourth
Amendment rights in the warrantless seizure, but that it was not
clearly established that such a seizure was unconstitutional. The
plaintiffs did not seek review in the Supreme Court, but the
defendants did, challenging the first-step determination that they had
violated the plaintiffs' rights. 96  A five-Justice majority first
concluded that the Court could hear the appeal even from a
victorious party in a qualified immunity case; a prevailing-party
appeal was permissible under the Court's statutory jurisdictional
grant 97 and qualified immunity presented a "policy reaso[n] . .. of
90. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (2011).
91. Compare id. at 2556-57 (considering dissimilarities to determine whether
there is a single common question with a common answer), with id. at 2565-67
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Rule 23(a)
examines only similarities among the plaintiffs).
92. Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
94. Id. at 2027.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2029-30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (granting Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction "[b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any
party").
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sufficient importance" to justify departing the settled prudential
practice of not reviewing prevailing-party petitions.9 8 After all that,
however, the Court dismissed the case as moot, because the plaintiff
no longer resided in Oregon and was about to turn eighteen. 99
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, agreed that the case was
moot and that the judgment should be vacated, but criticized the
majority for taking on the complicated and uncertain threshold issue
in a case in which there clearly was no longer a live case or
controversy and thus no reason to explore the controversial
appealability issue. oo
Fifth, the new civil procedure cases stand to be framed in
unfortunately simplistic political terms as the Court's conservative
majority protecting big business, in keeping with their broader
political and ideological preferences. Certainly corporate defendants
prevailed in some of the more significant cases-such as Wal-Mart,
McIntyre, Rent-A-Center, and Twombly. And the analysis in many
cases has been favorable to, and applauded by, repeat-player
defendants in modern litigation-notably business and government
defendants-seeking relief from the burdens of litigation, discovery,
and liability.01 Criticism of the new pleading regime has focused on
its likely disparate impact on plaintiffs in civil rights and other cases
in which a defendant's state of mind is unknowable without the
benefit of discovery, discovery now unavailable because the plaintiff
is unable to sufficiently plead state of mind at the outset.102 The
result in the eyes of many critics is a systematic slamming of the
courthouse door.103 One might call this the ideological drift of civil
procedure; conservative judges have adopted the idea once expressed
98. Id. at 2030 (alteration in original).
99. Id. at 2033-34.
100. Id. at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Epstein, supra note 39, at 66-68; Mark Herrmann & James M. Beck,
Opening Statement: Pleading Standards After Iqbal, in Debate: Plausible Denial:
Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA
141, 146-47 (2009). See Moller, supra note 48, at 693.
102. Burbank, supra note 39, at 117; A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil
Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HoW. L.J. 99, 160 (2008); Wasserman,
Procedural Mismatches, supra note 75, at 169.
103. Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans' Access to Courts?:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Stephen B. Burbank) [hereinafter Burbank Testimony].
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by former Democratic Congressman John Dingell: "I'll let you write
the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I'll screw you
every time."l 04
But a pure attitudinal model does not work in the main run of
procedure cases, which have not been categorically political. Most
have been unanimous or nearly unanimous,105 while in others the
Court has broadly agreed on the outcome if not the reasoning.106
Consider that Justice Souter wrote, and Justice Breyer joined, the
majority opinion in Twombly. Of course, both subsequently
dissented in Iqbal,10 7 perhaps suggesting that neither fully grasped
what the Court was doing in the earlier case. Consider also the split
in the non-minimalist case of Camreta.08 Justice Kagan wrote for
herself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg to reach the appealability issue despite mootness; Justices
Sotomayor and Breyer insisted it was unnecessary to reach the issue;
and Justices Kennedy and Alito criticized the majority for reaching
out to expand the Court's power to hear appeals from prevailing
parties-which they believed was unsupported by text or
precedent-and criticized existing qualified immunity doctrine.1 0 9
Other cases have similarly broken against simplistic popular
perceptions of ideological and political lines. In Shady Grove, the
Court held that Rule 23 governed certification of a class action on a
state-law claim in federal court, trumping a state rule that would
have prohibited such a class action. 110 Justice Scalia wrote an
104. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).
105. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2850 (2011) (unanimous); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2372
(2011) (unanimous); Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2489
(2010) (unanimous); Mohawk Indus., Inc v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 602 (2009)
(unanimous); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 311
(2007) (unanimous); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 373 (2007) (unanimous).
106. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546 (2011).
107. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 39, at 850.
108. Supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
109. Camreta v. Greene 131 S. Ct. at 2033; id at 2036-37 (Sotomayor, J.,
joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2038 (Kennedy, J., joined
by Alito, J., dissenting).
110. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1437 (2010).
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opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas and
Sotomayor, and Justice Stevens (in part), allowing the class action
under the federal rule,"' while Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined
with Justices Kennedy and Alito in an opinion that would have
forbidden it under the state rule.112
Adam Steinman argues that Shady Grove was a unique case
that reversed the litigants' typical positions for federalism purposes,
with the plaintiffs arguing for a uniquely plaintiff-friendly federal
rule." 3 But in the long run, plaintiffs are more likely to benefit from
favorable state rules and thus more likely to want state law to apply
in federal court, the position that the more liberal Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer urged; looking forward, therefore, the line-up of the
Justices makes ideological sense.1 14 On the other hand, odd line-ups
just may be part of Erie-Hanna, which makes sense given its
federalism grounding.'15 We saw a similarly unexpected ideological
divide fifteen years earlier in Gasperini v. Center for the
Humanities-the Court's most recent Erie-Hanna case prior to
Shady Grove."6 Justice Ginsburg wrote a majority opinion joined
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer requiring that a
state tort-reform provision designed to reduce the size of damage
awards-by enhancing the power of trial and appellate judges to
review and reduce jury awards-must apply in federal court. 117
Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, insisting that the more plaintiff-friendly federal
rule-requiring deferential review of jury awards-should apply." 8
Tellingly, however, the expected political divide does reveal
itself in the most fundamental procedure cases, those touching on
core issues at the heart of civil litigation and reflecting foundational
divides about the purpose and operation of the civil justice system.
111. Id. at 1434.
112. Id. at 1459.
113. Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1131, 1137 (2011).
114. Id at 1179.
115. Id. at 1180.
116. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418 (1996).
117. Id. at 418-19.
118. Id. at 448-49 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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The ideological 5-4 splits, in which the more conservative justices
prevail, have not been random. The Court has divided sharply in
cases addressing compelled arbitration of civil rights claims in lieu
of litigation," 9  class actions, 120 and pleading in civil rights
actions121-all cases bluntly limiting certain plaintiffs' access to the
courts and constraining (as a legal or practical matter) the
meaningful opportunity to obtain judicial remedies for violations of
rights. It also is notable that among the four Justices with
proceduralist backgrounds (Roberts, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan), the Chief Justice has been in the majority in the ideological
cases restricting court access and the other three have been in dissent
or at least in meaningful substantive disagreement with the Court.' 22
To the extent some procedure decisions can be explained as
purely ideological, it reveals some continuity between the Roberts
Court's focus on civil procedure and its predecessor Court's focus
on, and antipathy towards, litigation in general. Andrew Siegel
previously argued that a vast swath of the Rehnquist Court's
jurisprudence reflected "hostility" to litigation and an effort to
reduce opportunities to pursue legal or public goals through the
"social institution of litigation."l23 Siegel defined this hostility as an
"attitudinal orientation" against the "complex of cultural attitudes
about problem-solving, institutional arrangements, doctrinal rules,
and professional roles that nourish our particular judicially focused
dispute-resolution system."1 24 That hostility explained doctrines as
125 . 126diverse as state sovereign immunity, private rights of action,
119. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779-80
(2010).
120. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
121. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
122. Supra notes 82-92,105-18.
123. Siegel, supra note 3, at 1114.
124. Id.
125. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity acting under its power to
regulate Indian commerce).
126. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (rejecting private right
of action to enforce disparate impact regulations under Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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and attorneys' fees.127 Siegel also found a political valence at least
correlated to the outcomes of these cases, although this valence was
of limited force because most cases were not bluntly political.128
Particularly absent in those decisions was any "handwringing over
the denial of remedies to plaintiffs," or any "sense of reluctance that
symmetry or precedent requires an otherwise unpalatable result."12 9
The Roberts Court has shown similar hostility to litigation as
a means of vindicating legal rights, the apparent difference being that
this Court's hostility manifests itself in general procedural doctrine.
This ideological continuity is unsurprising, given that three members
of the Rehnquist Court's conservative wing remain on the Court, and
the additions of Chief Justice Roberts (who replaced Chief Justice
Rehnquist) and Justice Alito (who replaced Justice O'Connor) did
not meaningfully alter the Court's basic ideological balance. Note,
however, that we have seen in some more recent cases handwringing
over burdens on plaintiffs and possible denial of judicial access.1 30
III. THE ROBERTS COURT AND OTHER RULEMAKING ACTORS
While the Roberts Court has taken a renewed leadership role
in civil procedure, it is not the sole procedural rulemaker, and
adjudication is not the only way, and arguably not the best way,131 to
127. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health &
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (rejecting "catalyst theory" as basis for
awarding attorneys fees to civil rights plaintiffs).
128. Siegel, supra note 3, at 1126.
129. Id.
130. Cf McIntyre v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2799-801 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("Is not the burden on McIntyre UK to defend in New Jersey fair, i.e., a
reasonable cost of transacting business internationally, in comparison to the burden
on Nicastro to go to Nottingham, England to gain recompense for an injury he
sustained using McIntyre's product at his workplace in Saddle Brook, New
Jersey?").
131. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 39, at 850 (arguing that
rulemaking bodies, not courts, should have "hosted the discussion" of pleading
standards); Lumen Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, An Agency Approach to the
Supreme Court's Interpretation of Procedural Rules, 59 UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming June 2012) (manuscript at 5), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1897864 (arguing that notice-and-comment
rulemaking process of Civil Rules Advisory Committee is preferable to
332 [Vol. 31:2
CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL
make and elaborate on procedural rules. The early years of the
Roberts Court have been marked by a great deal of procedural
rulemaking outside of Supreme Court adjudication-by Congress, by
all the actors in the REA process, and by lower courts, all often
coming in response to the Court's adjudicative activity. This period
also has been marked by some strained or uncertain interactions
among the various procedural actors.
A. The Supreme Court and the Rules Enabling Act
The Roberts Court has been, at best, ambivalent towards the
REA. Formally, the Court is statutorily charged with promulgating
rules of procedure, with Congress reserving for itself only the power
to disapprove the rules the Court has created.132 Practically,
however, the process is controlled by the Standing Committee of the
Judicial Conference and the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, which
study, debate, draft, and approve rules through a lengthy, multi-stage
notice-and-comment process that now takes, on average, two to three
years.1 33 The Court does not review or approve potential rules until
they have been through five levels of committee and public
consideration and review. In fact, the Justices often see the Court's
role as that of a mere conduit, not certifying the merits or wisdom of
a particular rule or taking ownership of the underlying policies, but
signaling only that the committees properly adhered to rulemaking
processes.134
The idea that the committees, rather than the Court itself,
drive the rulemaking process arguably has affected the Court's
recent procedural adjudication. Perhaps the Justices have realized
that they wield greater, more direct power in an adjudicative posture,
adjudication); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1102 (2002)
("[A]lterations to the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] should undergo the
process specified in the Enabling Act, rather than taking effect through judicial flat
132. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (2006).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006). See also Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note
131 (manuscript at 14) (describing the timeline for amending rules in accordance
with the Enabling Act); Struve, supra note 131, at 1103-04 (same).
134. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 131 (manuscript at 61-62); Struve,
supra note 131, at 1127-28.
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rather than the more complicated rulemaking posture, and have
shifted their attention and efforts there. For example, while the
Court narrowed Rule 23 and class actions in a number of decisions,
including Wal-Mart13 5 and Concepcion,136 neither the committees
nor the Court have altered that rule in any meaningful way, and its
basic structure remains the same as when it was enacted in 1966."'
Pleading again exemplifies the Roberts Court's approach to
adjudicative rulemaking. Prior to 2007, the Court had twice declined
invitations to reject Conley or to demand anything more than a "short
plain statement" in civil rights cases, both times directing normative
arguments about the appropriate pleading standard to the REA
process.138 But the Roberts Court displayed no such qualms or
deference in Twombly or Iqbal.139 In fact, Twombly short-circuited a
preliminary discussion of notice pleading by the Advisor
Committee, a discussion tabled following the Court's decisions.
Critics of the new pleading regime have targeted this unexpected
willingness to alter the pleading standard through adjudication rather
than through rulemaking, criticizing the Court for making policy-
based decisions without the benefit of policy-based evidence or the
type of empirical study that the rulemaking process ensures.141
Interestingly, some legislative proposals to undo Twombly and Iqbal
would not have announced a new standard, but only reinstated the
status quo prior to Twombly, sending the issue to the committees for
more in-depth study and consideration.' 4 2
135. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
136. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
137. Scott Dodson, Squeezing Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 30,
2011, 3:35 p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/squeezing-class-actions/.
138. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002); Leatherman
v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-
69 (1993).
139. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 131 (manuscript at 9).
140. Minutes of Meeting of Civil Rules Advisory Committee, May 22-23,
2006, at 37, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/
FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Minutes.aspx.
141. Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 849, 876-77, 883 (2010);
Burbank, supra note 39, at 114, 116; Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 39, at 851.
142. Burbank Testimony, supra note 103 (arguing that legislation undoing
the Court's decisions should return to the status quo until more open and in-depth
study and discussion can proceed).
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The Court, or at least Justice Scalia, is sending similarly
mixed signals as to how much the committee process should
influence adjudication of Federal Rules questions. Writing for the
Court in Wal-Mart that Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality requirement
was not satisfied where there were significant differences among
class members, Justice Scalia never mentioned, much less relied on,
the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23 for guidance in
understanding the meaning and scope of the rule or the role of
predominance under 23(a) (as opposed to 23(b)). 143  Later, he
insisted that "it is the Rule itself, not the Advisory Committee's
description of it, that governs" in rejecting the argument that a class
could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) where claims for monetary
relief are tangential to claims for injunctive relief. 144 Similarly, in
Krupski v. Costa Crociere, Scalia flatly refused to join the portion of
the majority opinion that examined the Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 15 to determine the scope and meaning of mistake in relation
back.145 Scalia insisted that the Notes are equivalent to ordinary
legislative history, which he famously rejects as antithetical to
textualism in statutory interpretation. 4
But, as Catherine Struve has argued, the Advisory Committee
Notes are not ordinary legislative history. Legislative history
consists of reports by congressional committees and individual
members' floor-debate statements about a piece of legislation passed
by two distinct houses of Congress; such statements may not reflect
the views or intent of the enacting legislative body.14 7 By contrast,
the Advisory Committee is a singular body that prepares the
explanatory notes contemporaneously with the text of the rule and
both the text and Notes travel through the REA process together.14 8
Krupski marked just the second time that Justice Scalia had explicitly
rejected use of the Advisory Committee Notes in this way, while he
143. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-52 (2011).
144. Id. at 2559.
145. 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2498-99 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
146. Id.
147. Struve, supra note 131, at 1159-60.
148. Id. at 1159.
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has over the years written or joined multiple decisions that have cited
and relied on the Notes for interpretive authority. 149
Stricter textualism in rule interpretation also revives the
debate over how much interpretive leeway the Court should have. In
one view, the Court, being both rule interpreter and formal rulemaker
under the REA, has broader interpretive license; because the Court is
the source of the Rule, the separation of powers concerns triggered
by overly liberal statutory interpretation are absent.1 50  The
competing, and more recent, view accounts for the actual REA
process and the power the committees wield, insistin that the Court
owes a greater level of deference to the committees. In seeming to
favor the former position and seize greater interpretive latitude,
while also rejecting or limiting the persuasive or interpretive force of
the Advisory Committee Notes, the Court may be attempting to
wrest rulemaking away from the REA and the committees. By
elaborating on the rules through narrower, minimalist adjudication,
the Court itself makes new rules while circumventing the committees
and the interest-group conflicts built into the REA process.152
While the Court grapples with the appropriate balance
between adjudication and rulemaking, the REA process has been as
active as ever. The prior six years have seen a number of significant
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The most
notable was the Restyling Project, effective in December 2007,
which rewrote all the rules in clearer, more modem language and
organization, without changing the meaning or understanding of the
rules.1 53  There were major changes to the text of Rule 56 on
summary judgment, designed to bring the rule in line with practice
that had followed court-pronounced procedures; 154 to all the
149. Id. at 1161-63.
150. Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-Ate Illustration of the
Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 728-29 (1988); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme
Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1039, 1092-93 (1993).
151. Struve, supranote 131, at 1129-30, 1135.
152. Cf Moller, supra note 48, at 688-89.
153. Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 155, 156 (2006).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 56, Advisory Committee's Note to 2010 Amendment,
Subdivision (b).
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discovery rules to provide for disclosure and discovery of
electronically stored information;155 and to the basic rules for
amending pleadings.156 These changes show the modem rulemaking
process at work-a several-year process of multi-layered study,
public input, empirical analysis, and consideration of the broad
interaction of different rules and the body of the rules as a whole.
Interestingly, the Rules Committee has not gone beyond preliminary
discussion of Iqbal and Twombly, seemingly waiting for "convincing
empirical evidence that the cases are impacting dismissal practice"
before making a serious move to alter Rule 8(a) to override or affirm
those decisions.157  The Committee also may recognize that the
Court-which still must sign off on any changes to the Rules-is
unlikely to approve amendments that so quickly overturn its own
decisions.158
Of course, the Court has not abandoned its rulemaking
authority and still defers to its own rulemaking process, particularly
where Congress appears to have expressed a recent preference for
that move. Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter considered the scope of
the judge-made collateral order doctrine, an interpretation of the final
judgment rule that permits immediate appellate review of some
otherwise non-dispositive trial court decisions.159  The Court
unanimously declined to allow immediate review of orders rejecting
assertions of attorney-client privilege. 60 Critical to its analysis were
two recent congressional delegations of authority to the Court to
enact (through the REA process) rules defining finalityi16 and
establishing additional grounds for interlocutory appeals.162 Those
statutes, and the congressional assumption that the Court would act
on those new delegations, limited the appropriateness of judge-made
appealability doctrines. Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a), Advisory Committee's Note to 2009
Amendment.
157. Hoffman, supra note 39 (manuscript at 2).
158. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 39, at 857.
159. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603-05 (2009); 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
160. Id. at 603.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (as amended in 1990).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (as amended in 1992).
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emphasized the "important virtues" of rules enacted through the
REA, drawing as it does on the "collective experience of [the] bench
and bar" and "facilitat[ing] the adoption of measured, practical
solutions."l 6 3 Justice Thomas concurred to make that point even
more emphatically. He insisted that Congress's delegations are
entitled to full respect and that the policy judgments inherent in
deciding what issues should be subject to immediate review should
be left entirely to the rulemaking process and never addressed
through judge-made collateral-order doctrine analysis, as the
majority did even in rejecting the appeal. 164
B. The Supreme Court and the Lower Courts
The Supreme Court is not the only court engaged in
procedural rulemaking via adjudication. Most procedural questions
are decided in the lower federal courts, particularly by district court
judges addressing issues that cannot be appealed and remain entirely
in the district courts' hands. In fact, two commentators argue that
because the lower courts are available to handle routine procedural
adjudication and interpretation of the Rules, the Supreme Court
should spend less time in its adjudicative role and more time on
procedural rulemaking as the leader of the REA process.165
The best adjudication occurs when the Supreme Court clears
up confusion or inconsistencies among the lower courts and leaves
them with a clearer rule to apply going forward. For example, the
Court's recent decisions on jurisdictionality remind lower courts to
avoid imprecise jurisdictional rulings by adopting a narrow view of
what rules genuinely control adjudicative authority.166 Those efforts
appear to be working. For example, a Third Circuit panel overturned
two of its own precedents in holding that statutory limits on the
extraterritorial application of federal antitrust laws went to the merits
163. Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 609.
164. Id. at 612 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
165. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 131 (manuscript at 7).
166. Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 968; supra notes 34-38 and
accompanying text.
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rather than adjudicative jurisdiction.1 67  The court justified its
decision by citing more recent Roberts Court decisions, which,
though not involving antitrust laws, reflect a consistent trend towards
narrowing what is jurisdictional and a sharper recognition that
extraterritoriality (of all statutes) must be read as a merits
limitation.168 The decision initially created a multi-way split on the
issue.169 But lower courts are reading the same signals from the
Supreme Court and appear ready to resolve the split themselves. The
Seventh Circuit, one court on the opposite side of the split with the
Third Circuit, soon acknowledged that recent Supreme Court
decisions have called into question its jurisdictional view of
extraterritoriality of antitrust laws.170
Another success in this regard is Hertz Corp. v. Friend, in
which the Court clarified the meaning of "principal place of
business" as a place of corporate citizenship for diversity
jurisdiction. 7  The lower courts had overcomplicated the question,
adopting multi-factor tests and consistently adding new factors and
combinations of factors in deciding principal place.172 The result
was an approach "at war with administrative simplicity" that "has
failed to achieve a nationally uniform interpretation of federal
law."'173  The Court entered this debate explicitly to establish a
clearer, less administratively complex, generally obvious rule that
167. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., No. 10-2288, 2011
WL 3606995, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 17, 2011).
168. Id. at *2-3; Howard Wasserman, Third Circuit on Jurisdictionality of
FTAIA, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 23, 2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2011/08/third-circuit-on-jurisdictionality-of-ftaia.html.
169. Compare Animal Science, at *4 (treating FTAIA as a merits limitation),
with In re DRAM Antitrust Litigation, 546 F.3d 981, 985 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008)
(declining to resolve the issue), and United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem.
Co., 322 F.3d 942, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that
extraterritoriality of FTAIA goes to court's jurisdiction). See also Wasserman,
Drive-By, supra note 13, at 952; Howard Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and
Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REv. 227, 242-43 (2008) (arguing that FTAIA
should be handled as a merits limitation); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits and
Substantiality, supra note 13, at 688-89 (same).
170. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 658-59 (7th Cir.
2011). The court found it unnecessary to decide the issue in this case. Id.
171. 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1185 (2010).
172. Id. at 1185-86.
173. Id. at 1192.
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lower courts could apply in a nationally uniform manner. 174 It turned
to a much simpler, more straightforward definition of principal place
of business as the singular "place where a corporation's officers
direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities."1 75
At the same time, the Supreme Court has been ambivalent
towards the lower courts' role in interpreting and applying
procedural rules. Twombly and Iqbal were explicitly concerned with
civil litigation and burdensome discovery interfering with business
activities and the ability of high-ranking government officials to
perform their public functions. 176 One answer, suggested by Justice
Stevens, was to depend on trial judges to engage in managerial
judging-to exercise their discretion to tightly control and narrow
discovery in appropriate cases. 177 But the majority would have none
of it. During argument in Iqbal, Justice Scalia put it most pointedly:
"Well, I mean, that's lovely, that-that the-the ability of the
Attorney General and Director of the FBI to-to do their jobs
without having to litigate personal liability is dependent upon the
discretionary decision of a single district judge."1 7' In fact, careful
case management was particularly ineffective in civil rights cases
involving executive qualified immunity.179 Ironically, of course, the
solution for this distrust of trial judges' case-management abilities
was to vest those same judges with broad discretion to parse
pleadings and evaluate the plausibility of allegations through the
exercise of their personal judicial experiences and common sense.'so
Distrust aside, lower courts bear primary responsibility for
making the Court's procedural pronouncements work on the ground.
The assumption underlying the flood of scholarship that followed
Iqbal and Twombly was that the cases worked a major, dramatic
174. Id. at 1193-94.
175. Id. at 1192.
176. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
177. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-36, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015), 2008 WL 5168391.
179. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
180. Id. at 1950; Miller, supra note 39, at 30; Wasserman, Procedural
Mismatches, supra note 75, at 176-77.
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change in pleading law.18' The issue for the lower courts was to
figure out the degree: what the cases actually meant, what they
would bring about on the ground, how they would change pleading
and civil litigation for better or for worse, and what category of cases
would be particularly hard hit.182 But no one could say for certain
what lower courts would do with these "deeply inscrutable"
decisions.1
Scholars and policymakers have sought to measure the effect
on the lower courts, but studies have yielded inconsistent
conclusions that often turn on the methodology used and the framing
of the results.184 Two findings have been consistent. One is an
increase in 12(b)(6) activity in the district courts, meaning an
increase in the filing of motions to dismiss.' 85 The second,
especially prominent in a study by the Federal Judicial Center for the
Advisory Committee, and somewhat corroborated in others, is that
the increase in the granting of 12(b)(6) motions has largely been on
181. Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J.
119, 122-23 (2011).
182. Supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
183. Moller, supra note 48, at 645-46. See also Miller, supra note 39, at 28
(observing that the Court's "radical departure" in Twombly and Iqbal from prior
pleading practice "raise[d] novel questions of how the new pleading-motion
regime [would] work going forward .... ).
184. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1 (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdflfile/motioniqbal.pdf (analyzing filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Patricia W. Hatamyar,
An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal 's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, U. RICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1883650 [hereinafter Hatamyar, Updated Study];
Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010) [hereinafter Hatamyar, Tao];
Hoffman, supra note 39 (manuscript at 17-18); William H. J. Hubbard, The
Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1883831.
185. CECIL ET AL., supra note 184, at 8-12; Hoffman, supra note 39
(manuscript at 16).
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grants with leave to amend-that is, with the plaintiff having an
opportunity to replead and correct the defects in the pleading.' 86
Both findings make intuitive sense. If Iqbal and Twombly
signal to lower-court judges that their prior, stricter approach was
authorized by Rule 8(a)(2), the decisions also incentivize defense
lawyers to at least explore early dismissal. But Twombly and Iqbal
were about factual sufficiency in complaints-the amount of fact and
detail that plaintiffs must plead to state a claim and get to discovery.
A factual-insufficiency dismissal typically should be accompanied
by an opportunity to replead and add (if possible) greater detail to
cure the defect.' 87 This suggests an unexpected dynamic in the lower
courts: courts are granting motions to dismiss, but are dismissing
without prejudice and giving plaintiffs additional opportunities to
plead the necessary facts, rather than dismissing the complaint
entirely. 8 8 Lower court judges now may be seeking some balance in
the face of charges that Iqbal slammed the courthouse doors on
plaintiffs. Complaints will be dismissed, but plaintiffs will be given
additional opportunities to get it right. Meanwhile, the ironic effect
is increased litigation costs, shifted away from discovery (which is
what motivated the majorities in both Iqbal and Twombly and what
concerned many commentators 89) and into the threshold pleading
stage.
One might argue that giving plaintiffs an opportunity to replead
to try to state a claim means the harsh effects of Iqbal have been
mitigated.190 But there are problems with that argument. First, the
186. CECIL ET AL., supra note 184, at 13-14; Hatamyar, Updated Study,
supra note 184 (manuscript at 2); Hatamyar, Tao, supra note 184, at 598, 618;
Hoffman, supra note 39 (manuscript at 17).
187. Vance v. Rumsfeld, Nos. 10-1687, 10-2442, 2011 WL 3437511, at *14
n.11 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2011); Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches, supra note 75,
at 182.
188. Hoffman, supra note 39 (manuscript at 17-18).
189. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); Epstein, supra note 39, at 66-67; Herrmann
& Beck, supra note 101, at 157.
190. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF
RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1, 4 (2011),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/
motioniqbal2.pdf; Hoffman, supra note 39 (manuscript at 17).
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initial Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study showed that amended
complaints were more likely to be dismissed without leave to
amend. 191 This suggests that while courts give plaintiffs additional
opportunities to cure defects, at some point, perhaps as soon as the
first amended complaint, a plaintiff runs out of chances and the
courthouse door is shut by the higher pleading standard. Second, a
follow-up FJC study released in November 2011 found that the
opportunity to amend did produce a statistically significant reduction
in the overall rate of movant advantage and success on 12(b)(6).192
But this cannot necessarily account for cases in which plaintiffs were
deterred from repleading after the first dismissal, resigned to being
unable to martial the necessary information or resources to overcome
the inevitable successive motion to dismiss.1 93
Four years after Twombly and two years after Iqbal, we do
not see any particular pattern in the lower courts. Perhaps lower
courts are still undertaking the difficult task of working out the
precedent. Perhaps, as Marc Moller argues, the Court simply
"intervene[d] against a set stage of heterogeneous lower court
practice" and "provide[d] formal cover for that heterogeneity."' 94
Perhaps we will see not common trends, but rather continued
heterogeneity and variance among cases and courts. At a minimum,
1qbal has empowered district judges resolving 12(b)(6) motions to
rely on their common sense and judicial experience, an inherently
discretionary inquiry likely to produce just such variance.195 Or
perhaps it just takes longer to identify any consistent or widely
common trends in the lower courts. 9 6
191. CECIL ET AL., supra note 184, at 22, 28.
192. CECIL ET AL., supra note 190, at 1, 4.
193. Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches, supra note 75, at 182.
194. Levin, supra note 49, at 151-52; Moller, supra note 48, at 667. See
also supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
195. Miller, supra note 39, at 30; Wasserman, Procedural Mismatches,
supra note 75, at 177; Hoffman, supra note 39 (manuscript at 1-2). Cf Gideon
Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483,
1502 (2007) (arguing that variance is a positive outcome for fact-specific
inquiries).
196. Stephen B. Burbank, Rebuttal: Time Out, in Debate: Plausible Denial:
Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA L. REV. PENNUMBRA
141, 152 (2009); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 39, at 839-40, 846; Hubbard,
supra note 184 (manuscript at 32).
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Krupski v. Costa Crociere provides another example of
lower-court judges working out the precise scope of a Supreme
Court decision. Krupski adopted an expansive interpretation of the
"mistake concerning the proper party's identity" prong for relating
back amendments under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).1 9 7 A mistake occurs,
the Court held, whenever a party "misunderstood crucial facts"
regarding potential defendants' liability and thus failed to name a
possibly liable person, in contrast to a "fully informed decision" not
to pursue a particular person as a defendant.198 The Court cited
several dictionary definitions of mistake, including one calling it "a
wrong action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment,
inadequate knowledge or inattention."l 99 The broad analysis turned
on the goals of relation back-balancing the defendant-protective
policies underlying statutes of limitations with the preference in Rule
15 for resolution on the merits that demanded a broad understanding
of when a mistake has occurred.200
One question that has long confounded lower courts is
whether a plaintiff makes a mistake when she sues a John Doe or
pseudonymous defendant, where the defendant's true identity is not
known to the plaintiff at the time of filing the original complaint.
Prior to Krupski, most courts had held that lack of knowledge is not a
mistake under Rule 15, thus an amended complaint could not relate
back when the plaintiff later discovers Doe's real name.201 Krupski
did not involve an unknown defendant, but the Court's expansive,
policy-based understanding of mistake has caused some district
197. Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2493-94 (2010).
198. Id. at 2493-94, 2496.
199. Id. at 2493-94.
200. Id. at 2494.
201. Howard M. Wasserman, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and John Doe
Defendants: A Study in Section 1983 Procedure, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 793, 797-
98 (2003). Compare Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 470-71 (4th Cir.
2007) (insisting that lack of knowledge of defendant's name is not a mistake), and
Barrow v. Wethersfield, 66 F.3d 466, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), with
Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 200-01 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2001)
(applying prior circuit precedent allowing relation back of a claim against a
previously unknown defendant and calling on Rules Advisory Committee to
clarify the issue).
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courts to reconsider, creating a new split. 202 If a mistake is a failure
to name a party as a result of anything less than a fully informed
decision, including insufficient knowledge of some fact, there is no
reason that lack of knowledge of the defendant's actual name can
never be a mistake.
C. The Court and Congress
Congress has also become more active in procedural
rulemaking. The most prominent piece of procedural legislation was
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, which pushed large-money
state-law class actions from state to federal court by granting federal
jurisdiction on minimal diversity.20 3 The Court has yet to directly
handle a CAFA case, other than to note its inapplicability to the class
actions that had reached the Court.204  Senator Al Franken has
pushed back against decisions favoring arbitration over litigation,
sponsoring a successful amendment to the 2010 Defense
Appropriations Bill that limited the power of federal-government
contractors to compel arbitration, 205 and proposing an amendment to
the Federal Arbitration Act prohibiting corporations from compelling
202. Compare Daniel v. City of Matteson, No. 09-cv-3171, 2011 WL
198132, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2011) (holding that relation back unequivocally
requires mistake and lack of knowledge as to proper defendant is not a mistake),
and Dominguez v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 2620, 2010 WL 3419677, at
*2-3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 27, 2010) (same), with Archibald v. City of Hartford, 274
F.R.D. 371, 377-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (discussing whether Krupski changes
analysis of whether lack of knowledge of defendant's name constitutes mistake),
and Bishop v. Best Buy Co., No. 08 Civ. 8427, 2010 WL 4159566, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2010) (same).
203. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2006).
204. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376 (2011). Smith held that
the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, barred a federal court, which had
rejected class certification under Rule 23, from enjoining a substantially identical
state-court class action. Id. The state class action in Smith was not removable
because there was only minimal diversity, but it likely would have been removable
under CAFA; this indicates that future defendants will not have to worry about
parallel or duplicative state class actions, and the need for a federal injunction of
state litigation likely will not arise. Id. at 2381-82 & n.12.
205. Franken Amendment, S. Amend. 2588, to Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th Cong. § 8116(a)(1) (2009).
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employees to arbitrate civil rights, sexual harassment, and assault
claims.206
Congress also must confront procedural concerns when
trying to respond to the Court on substantive matters. In Morrison v.
National Australian Bank, the Court held that the extraterritorial
application of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was a
merits question, 20 but that § 10(b) and Rule 10-b(5) (promulgated
under § 10(b) and coextensive with it) did not apply to misconduct
by foreign defendants who harmed foreign plaintiffs in securities
transactions on foreign exchanges. 208  In § 929P(b) of the 2010
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Congress attempted to overturn Morrison and give federal securities
fraud law extraterritorial reach.
Congress did so by amending the jurisdictional provisions in
three securities statutes, granting district courts jurisdiction over
actions initiated by the government concerning "conduct occurring
outside the United States that has a foreseeable effect within the
United States" or "within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors." 209 But Congress failed to amend § 10(b), the
substantive securities fraud provision interpreted in Morrison as not
having extraterritorial application. Substantive federal securities
fraud law, as interpreted, thus remains unamended, unaltered, and,
under Morrison, without extraterritorial reach. In other words,
federal district courts have adjudicative jurisdiction over certain
extraterritorial cases, but no substantive federal law applies
extraterritorially or prohibits extraterritorial behavior.
206. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).
207. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876-77 (2010).
It logically follows that extraterritorial application of other federal statutes also is a
merits question. Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 951-52.
208. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78, 2883.
209. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010) (amending Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; and
Investors Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14).
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Congress failed to recognize the Court's broader procedural
agenda of eliminating imprecise "drive-by jurisdictional rulings." 210
The Court needs Congress to be similarly cautious in what it
legislatively labels as jurisdictional-Congress must avoid enacting
drive-by jurisdictional statutes.21 1 But § 929P is just such a drive-by
enactment; it attempts to achieve substantive results by tinkering
with jurisdiction without actually altering substantive legal rules.
Congress completely missed what the Court signaled in Morrison; it
read only the substance of the Court's extraterritoriality analysis and
sought to override that, but missed the finer, equally important,
procedural point about jurisdictionality that should have told
Congress how to amend substantive legal rules.
A different, potentially more significant, trend is
Congressional efforts to engage more directly with the Federal Rules
beyond its limited role in the REA proceSS21 by amending the Rules
via ordinary bicameral legislation. These proposals are frequently
made and discussed, although they are never enacted or seriously
pursued. Former Senator Arlen Specter was the driving force behind
several Senate efforts to undo Twombly and Iqbal and return to the
pleading regime established by Rule 8(a)(2) and Conley.2 13 In 2011,
the Republican-controlled House introduced the Lawsuit Abuse
Reduction Act (LARA), comprehensive tort-reform legislation that
included amendments to Rule 11 making sanctions for frivolous
filings mandatory rather than discretionary, focusing sanctions on
compensating the party that sought the sanctions rather than
deterring future misconduct, and making imposition of attorneys'
fees the common and preferred sanction.214
This competing congressional activity demonstrates that there
is no essential political valence behind legislative efforts to control
210. Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 947; supra notes 34-38, 171-
75.
211. Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 13, at 961.
212. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006).
213. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009);
Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111 th Cong. (2009); Burbank
Testimony, supra note 103.
214. Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2011, S. 533, 112th Cong. (2011);
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2011, H.R. 966, 112th Cong. (2011). Similar
bills were proposed when the Republicans controlled Congress during the previous
decade. See Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2005, H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005).
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procedural rules; it merely depends on the rules targeted. Democrats
seek to overturn Supreme Court interpretations of rules seen as anti-
plaintiff, while Republicans seek to change REA-promulgated rules
to the benefit of business defendants. Notably, both proposals reflect
congressional ambivalence towards the REA-LARA appears borne
of the concern that interest-group politics within the REA process
would defeat any proposal for a stricter Rule 11,215 while proposals
addressing pleading standards assume that the Court is unlikely to
216
approve a rule overturning its recent judicial interpretations.
Congress's new procedural engagement gives the Court
another actor to which to punt procedural questions, beyond
resolving them itself or sending them to the Rules Committee. For
example, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in McIntyre suggested
that Congress might enact a statute establishing personal jurisdiction
in federal court in diversity cases based on national contacts, even if
the defendant lacks contacts with the forum state or any other single
state.217
The choice to direct the issue to Congress is telling. There is
a nice question whether the Court (or, more fundamentally, the
rulemaking committees) could provide via the REA for national-
contacts jurisdiction in diversity cases. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(2) already allows for such personal jurisdiction in
federal question cases.218 Enacting a similar provision for diversity
cases through the Federal Rules raises REA concerns, 2 19 while doing
so via statute raises Erie federalism and choice of law issues.220
More fundamentally, deferring the issue of national contacts to
Congress or the REA process still leaves open the very issue that has
divided lower courts-whether jurisdiction based on national
contacts, even if statutorily authorized, comports with due process, a
215. Moller, supra note 48, at 689.
216. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 39, at 857.
217. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) ("It
may be that, assuming it were otherwise empowered to legislate on the subject, the
Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts.").
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
219. Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 81 n.316
(2010). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.").
220. Erbsen, supra note 219, at 50 n.203.
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constitutional question that a statutory grant of jurisdiction does not
221
obviate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps calling the Roberts Court's recent activity a civil
procedure "revival" overstates things. The Rehnquist Court did not
entirely ignore civil procedure.222 Procedure cases remain a small
part of the Court's already small docket.223 Nevertheless, more than
twenty procedure cases on in six years is not insignificant.
Concurring in the judgment in McIntyre, Justice Breyer
expressed uncertainty as to how the current personal-jurisdiction
framework works (or does not work) in light of modem technology,
communications, travel, and commerce, hinting that he, too, would
be open to reconsidering and changing the analysis if presented with
a more modem case. 22 Breyer called on the Court to find a case
implicating those modem issues quickly, so the Court might fully air
225
and resolve those questions. The irony, of course, is that modem
technology, communications, travel, and commerce make it easier
for people and entities to reach into and engage in foreign forums
through their conduct and also to litigate there, arguably pushing the
doctrine towards a greater focus on foreseeability, convenience, and
fundamental procedural fairness 22 6 and a lesser focus on concepts
221. Id. at 51-52 & nn.211-14.
222. Particularly as to Rule 23 and class actions, see e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
626 n.20 (1997), and subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Exxon Mobil v.
Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310 (2005).
223. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 131 (manuscript at 54).
224. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2793-94 (Breyer,
J., concurring in the judgment). Two days after deciding McIntyre, the Court
denied cert in two personal jurisdiction cases, including an Ohio case involving
internet activity. Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 3091 (2011); Roberts v. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C., 930
N.E. 2d 784 (Ohio 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3089 (2011).
225. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791-94 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
226. Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal
Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38
JURIMETRICS 575, 608 (1998); Dustin E. Buehler, Economic Evolution,
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such as sovereign authority, consent, and submission to power that
dominate Justice Kennedy's plurality.227 In any event, expect the
Court to take up personal jurisdiction again soon; we might even see
the next decade repeat the 1980s, when the Court decided many of
its canonical personal jurisdiction cases.228
And it is not only about personal jurisdiction, as the October
2011 Term again includes several cases addressing core procedural
and jurisdictional issues. 229  In addition, the Court reached out to
pronounce that the First Amendment's ministerial exemption to
federal employment law is a constitutional affirmative defense to the
merits of a discrimination claim and not a limit on the court's
adjudicative jurisdiction,230 continuing its drive to clarify the line
between jurisdiction and merits.231
Moreover, the Roberts Court, in its current or in ideologically
similar form, likely will last for another generation. Five of the nine
justices are under the age of sixty-five; four have served six years or
Jurisdictional Revolution 45-47 (July 8, 2011) (manuscript at 45-47), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1880975).
227. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786-89.
228. E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S.
102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770
(1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 366 U.S.408 (1984); Ins.
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
229. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 10-1195, 2012 WL 125429,
at *7 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2012) (holding that federal statute granting state courts
jurisdiction over federal cause of action did not strip federal courts of jurisdiction
over that cause of action); Gonzalez v. Thaler, No. 10-895, 2012 WL 43513, at *9
(U.S. Jan. 10, 2012) (holding that content of Certificate of Appealability in habeas
action was non-jurisdictional). See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,
132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (granting certiorari on whether corporate liability under the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, goes to subject matter jurisdiction or merits
of the claim); First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 131 S. Ct. 3022 (2011) (granting
certiorari on standing to sue under federal statute); Reynolds v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 1043 (2011) (granting certiorari on standing to challenge Attorney General
rulemaking).
230. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, No.
10-553, 2012 WL 75047, at *15 n.4 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012).
231. Howard M. Wasserman, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, Prescriptive
Authority, and the Ministerial Exemption, _ U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
(forthcoming 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
350 [Vol. 31:2
CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIVAL
fewer, including three of the Justices whose backgrounds evince a
232
unique interest in civil litigation and its processes.22 In short, there
is good reason to expect the Roberts Court to continue the civil
procedure revival and to continue making procedure a central part of
its jurisprudential agenda.
232. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME CT. OF
THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct.
13, 2011).
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